Traditional Byzantine resilient algorithms use 2f +1 vertex disjoint paths to ensure message delivery in the presence of up to f Byzantine nodes. The question of how these paths are identified is related to the fundamental problem of topology discovery.
Introduction
Self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient topology discovery is a fundamental distributed task that enables communication among parties in the network even if some of the components are compromised by an adversary. Such topology discovery is becoming extremely important nowadays where countries main infrastructures, such as the electrical smart-grid, water supply networks and intelligent transportation systems are subject
Preliminaries
We consider settings of a standard asynchronous system [cf. 5] . The system consists of a set, N = {p i } of communicating entities, chosen from a set P , which we call nodes. The upper bound on the number of nodes in the system is n = |P |. Each node has a unique identifier. Sometime we refer to a set, P \ N , of nonexisting nodes that a false indication on their existence can be recorded in the system. A node p i can directly communicate with its neighbors, N i ⊆ N . The system can be represented by a network of directly communicating nodes, G = (N, E), named the communication graph, where E = {(p i , p j ) ∈ N × N : p j ∈ N i }. We denote N k 's set of indices by indices(N k ) = {m : p m ∈ N k } and N k 's set of edges by edges(N j ) = {p j } × N j .
The r-neighborhood of a node p i ∈ N is the connected component that includes p i and all nodes that can be reached from p i by a path of length r or less. The r-neighborhood version of the algorithm for network topology discovery considers communication graphs in which the number of neighbors of a node p i is bounded by a constant ∆. Hence, when both the neighborhood radius, r, and the node degree ∆ are constants the number of nodes in the r-neighborhood is also bounded by a constant, namely by [ 
[O(∆ r+1 ).]]
We model the communication channel, queue i,j , from node p i to node p j ∈ N i as a FIFO queuing list of the messages that p i has sent to p j and p j is about to receive. When p i sends message m, the operation send inserts a copy of m to every queue i,j , such that p j ∈ N i . We assume that the number of messages in transit, i.e., stored in queue i,j , is at most capacity. Once m arrives, p j executes receive and m is dequeued.
We assume that p i is completely aware of N i , as in [15] . In particular, we assume that the identity of the sending node is known to the receiving one. In the context of the studied problem, we say that node p i ∈ N is correct if it reports on its genuine neighborhood, N i . A Byzantine node, p b ∈ N , is a node that can send arbitrarily corrupted messages. Byzantine nodes can introduce new messages and modify or omit messages that pass through them. This way they can, e.g., disinform correct nodes about their neighborhoods, or about the neighborhood of other correct nodes, or the path through which messages travel, to name a very few specific misleading actions that Byzantine nodes may exhibit. We denote by C and B the set of correct, and respectively, Byzantine nodes. We assume that |B| = f , the identity of the nodes in B is unknown to the nodes in C. Nevertheless, B is fixed throughout the considered execution segment. These execution segments are long enough for convergence and then for obtaining sufficient useful work. We assume that between any pair of correct nodes there are at least 2f + 1 vertex disjoints paths. We denote by G c = (C, E ∩ C × C) the correct graph induced by the set of correct nodes.
Self-stabilizing algorithms never terminate (see [5] ). The non-termination property can be easily identified in the code of a self-stabilizing algorithm: the code is usually a do forever loop that contains communication operations with the neighbors. An iteration is said to be complete if it starts in the loop's first line and ends at the last (regardless of whether it enters branches).
Every node, p i , executes a program that is a sequence of (atomic) steps. For ease of description, we assume the interleaving model where steps are executed atomically, a single step at any given time. An input event can either be the receipt of a message or a periodic timer going off triggering p i to send. Note that the system is totally asynchronous and the (non-fixed) node processing rates are irrelevant to the correctness proof.
The state s i of a node p i consists of the value of all the variables of the node (including the set of all incoming communication channels, {queue j,i |p j ∈ N i }). The execution of a step in the algorithm can change the state of a node. The term (system) configuration is used for a tuple of the form (s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n ), where each s i is the state of node p i (including messages in transit for p i ). We define an execution E = c by the execution of the step a [x] . We often associate the notation of a step with its executing node p i using a subscript, e.g., a i . An execution R (run) is fair if every correct node, p i ∈ C, executes a step infinitely often in R. Time (e.g. needed for convergence) is measured by the number of asynchronous rounds, where the first asynchronous round is the minimal prefix of the execution in which every node takes at least one step. The second asynchronous round is the first asynchronous round in the suffix of the run that follows the first asynchronous round, and so on. The message complexity (e.g. needed for convergence) is the number of messages measured in the specific case of synchronous execution.
We define the system's task by a set of executions called legal executions (LE) in which the task's requirements hold. A configuration c is a safe configuration for an algorithm and the task of LE provided that any execution that starts in c is a legal execution (belongs to LE). An algorithm is self-stabilizing with relation to the task LE when every infinite execution of the algorithm reaches a safe configuration with relation to the algorithm and the task.
Topology Discovery
The topology discovery is based on accumulating messages from vertex disjoint paths. Each message contains an ordered list of nodes it passed so far, starting in a source node, and a neighborhood, which is the set of nodes, claimed to be directly connected to the source.
Each node p i periodically sends a message to each neighbor. The message sent contains the local topology, a source i and an empty path. The arrival of a message m to p i triggers an insert of m to inf ormedT opology i and a consistency test of the content of inf ormedT opology i . The consistency test results in storing local topologies for which there are enough independent evidence in a result array. The result array is initialized just prior to the consistency test. The consistency test of p i iterates over each node p k such that, p k appears in at least one of the messages stored in inf ormedT opology i . For each such node p k , node p i checks whether there are at least f + 1 messages from the same source node that have mutually vertex disjoint paths and report on the same neighborhood. The neighborhood of each such p k , that has at least f + 1 vertex disjoint paths with identical neighborhood, is accumulated in Result [k] . Moreover, the total number of paths [[that] ] relayed this neighborhood is kept in Count [k] .
We note that there may still be nodes p f ake ∈ P \(C ∪B), for which there is an entry Result[f ake]. For example, inf ormedT opology may contain f messages, all originated from different Byzantine nodes, and a message m ′ that appears in the initial configuration and supports the (false) neighborhood the Byzantine messages refer to. These f + 1 messages can contain mutually vertex disjoint paths, and thus during the consistency test, a result will be found for Result[f ake]. We show that during the next computations, the message m ′ will be identified and ignored.
The Result set should include two reports for each (undirected) edge; the two nodes that are attached to the edge, each send a report. Hence, Result includes a set of directed (report) edges. The term contradicting edge is needed when examining the Result set consistency.
Definition 1 (Contradicting edges)
Given two nodes, p i , p j ∈ P , we say that the edge (p i , p j ) is contradicting with the set N eighborhood j ⊆ edges(
Following the consistency test, p i examines the Result array for contradictions. Node p i checks the path of each message m ∈ inf ormedT opology i with source p r , neighborhood neighborhood r and P ath r . If every edge (p s , p j ) on the path appears in Result[s] and Result[j], then we move to the next message. Otherwise, we found a fake supporter, and therefore we reduce Count[r] by one. In case the resulting Count[r] is smaller than f + 1, we nullify the r'th entry of the Result array. Once all messages were processed, the Result array consisting of the (confirmed) local topologies is the output. At the end p i forwards the arriving message m to each neighbor that does not appear in the path of m. The message sent by p i includes the node from which m arrived as part of the path m.
The pseudocode appears in Algorithm 1. In every iteration of the infinite loop, p i starts to compute its preliminary topology view by calling ComputeResults in line 2. Then, every node p k in the queue Inf ormedT opology, node p i goes over the messages in the queue from head to bottom. While iterating the queue, for every message m with source p k , neighborhood N k and visited path P ath k , p i inserts P ath k to opinion [ Upon receiving a message m, node p i inserts the message to the queue, in case it does not already exist, and just moves it to the top of the queue in case it does. The node p i now needs to relay the message p i got to all neighbors that are not on the message visited path (line 9). When sending, p i also attaches the identifier of the node, from which the message was received, to the visited path of the message. Algorithm's correctness proof.
We now prove that within a linear amount of asynchronous rounds, the system stabilizes and every output is legal. The proof considers an arbitrary starting configuration with arbitrary messages in transit that could be actually in the communication channel or already stored in p j 's message queue and will be forwarded in the next steps of p j . Each message in transit that traverse correct nodes can be forwarded within less than O(|C|) asynchronous rounds. Note that any message that traverses Byzantine nodes and arrives to a correct node that has at least one Byzantine node in its paths. The reason is that the correct neighbor to the last Byzantine in the path lists the Byzantine node when forwarding the message. Thus, f is at most the number of messages that encode vertex disjoint paths from a certain source that are initiated or corrupted by a Byzantine node. Since there are at least f + 1 vertex disjoint paths with no Byzantine nodes from any source p k to any node p i and since p k repeatedly sends messages to all nodes on all possible paths, p i receives at least f + 1 messages from p k with vertex disjoint paths.
The usage of the FIFO queue and the repeated send operations of p k ensure that the most recent f + 1 messages with vertex disjoint paths in Inf ormedT opology queue are uncorrupted messages. Namely, misleading messages that were present in the initial configuration will be pushed to appear below the new f + 1 uncorrupted messages. Thus, each node p i eventually has the local topology of each correct node (stored in the Result i array). The opposite is however not correct as local topologies of non-existing nodes may still appear in the result array. For example, Inf ormedT opology i may include in the first configuration f + 1 messages with vertex disjoint paths for a non-existing node.
Since after ComputeResults we know the correct neighborhood of each correct node p k , we may try to ensure the validity of all messages. For every message that encodes a non-existing source node, there must be a node p ℓ on the message path, such that p ℓ is correct and p ℓ 's neighbor is non-existing, this is true since p i itself is correct. Thus, we may identify these messages and ignore them. Furthermore, no valid messages are ignored because of this validity check.
We also note that, since we assume that the nodes of the system are a subset of P . The size of the queue Inf ormedT opology is bounded. Next, we bound the amount of memory of a node. The details of the correctness and convergence proofs appear in the Appendix and in [7] . Algorithm 1: Topology discovery, code for node p i Input: N eighborhood i : The ids of the nodes with which node p i can communicate directly; Output: Conf irmedT opology ⊂ P × P : Discovered topology, which is represent by a directed edge set; Variable Inf ormedT opology : Queue, see Figure 1 : topological messages, node, neighborhood, path ; Function: N odeDisjointP aths(S): Test S = { node, neighborhood, path } to encode at least f + 1 vertex disjoint paths; Function: P athContradictsN eighborhood(k, N eighborhood k , path): Test that there is no node p j ∈ N for which there is an edge (p k , p j ) in the message's visited path, path ⊆ P × N , such that (p k , p j ) is contradicting with N eighborhood k ; 1 while true do 2 Result ← ComputeResults() r-neighborhood discovery. Algorithm 1 demonstrates the existence of a deterministic self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient algorithm for topology discovery. Lemma 1 shows that the memory costs are high when the entire system topology is to be discovered. We note that one may consider the task of r-neighborhood
Insert item m to the head of the queue.
• Remove(M essagem): Remove item m from the queue.
• Iterator(): Returns an pointer for iterating over the queue's elements by the order in which they reside in the queue.
• HasN ext(): Tests whether the Iterator is at the end of the queue.
• N ext() Returns the next element to iterate over.
• SizeOf () Returns the number of elements in the calling set.
• M oveT oHead(m): Move item m to the head of the queue.
• IsAf ter(m, S): Test that item m is after the items m ′ ∈ S, where S is a set of items in the queue. Figure 1 : Queue: general purpose data structure for queuing items, and its operation list.
discovery. Recall that in the r-neighborhood discovery task, it is assumed that every r-neighborhood cannot be partitioned by Byzantine nodes. Therefore, it is sufficient to constrain the maximal path length in line 9. The correctness proof of the algorithm for the r-neighborhood discovery follows similar arguments to the correctness proof of Algorithm 1.
End-to-End Delivery
We use the discovered network topology to design a self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient algorithm for the transport layer protocol. Namely, using the repeatedly collected topology information for implementing endto-end communication between (not necessarily neighboring) nodes. In this context, we face the challenge of finding f + 1 correct vertex disjoint paths and the need to propose efficient solutions for different system settings.
The value of Conf irmedT opology is a set of directed edges (p i , p j ). An undirected edge is approved if both (p i , p j ) and (p j , p i ) appear in Conf irmedT opology. An edge is said to be suspected, whenever only one edge (in one direction) appears in Conf irmedT opology. The sender has to choose 2f + 1 vertex independent paths to the receiver. If there exists at least one such set of paths then the sender can safely use them to communicate with the receiver (similar to Algorithm 1). However, the collected topology may not include even one such set of 2f + 1 vertex independent paths. The reason is that f of the paths that should appear in the collected topology may be controlled by Byzantine nodes. Namely, the information about at least one edge in each such path may not arrive to the sender.
We propose three procedures for overcoming this difficulty in different system setting. The first procedure assumes f is a constant. Thus, the sender may apply the following procedure for selecting a set of vertex disjoint paths P aths, that contains f + 1 correct paths. For each possible choice of f nodes p 1 , p 2 , . . . p f in the system, the sender computes a new graph G ′ which is the result of removing p 1 , p 2 , . . . p f , from G out , the graph defined by the collected topology. The sender now computes a set P of vertex disjoint paths, where |P| = f + 1, if such a set exists. For each such set P, the sender relays the current message on all paths in P. First we show that this procedure only sends message through a polynomial number of paths. There are O(n f ) possibilities for choosing f nodes from the system. Thus, O(n f ) sets of paths are computed, and since f is a constant, this number is polynomial. Moreover, each such set contains at most f + 1 paths, because p i only computes a set P of size f + 1. Thus, in total, the sender sends the message on at most a polynomial number of paths. We now show that this procedure ensures that the message is sent on a sufficient amount of correct paths i.e., f + 1. Consider the permutation in which the set of f chosen nodes actually contains the set of Byzantine nodes in the system. Thus G ′ contains only correct nodes. Furthermore, at least f + 1 paths that were present in G out are still present in G ′ , since we removed f nodes. Hence, in G ′ , there are at least f + 1 correct vertex disjoint paths. As stated, the sender chooses a set of paths of size f + 1. Each of these paths is correct, and therefore the sender sends the message on at least f + 1 correct vertex disjoint paths as needed.
The second procedure assumes that r and ∆ are both constants. The sender sends the message over all possible paths to the receiver. This is feasible only when considering r-neighborhoods, rather than the entire connected component, where the neighborhood radius, r, and the node degree ∆ are constants. Next, we present a polynomial solution for the case in which f , r and ∆ are not constants, assuming that Byzantine nodes are not directly connected.
The third procedure assumes that Byzantine nodes cannot be immediate neighbors and that all neighbors of a given Byzantine node refer to the Byzantine with the same identifier. Our polynomial cost solution considers the (extended) graph, G ext , that includes all the edges in conf irmedT opology and suspicious edges, see Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Suspicious edges) Given three nodes, p i , p j , p k ∈ P , we say that node p i considers the undirected edge (p k , p j ) suspicious, if the edge appears as a directed edge in Conf irmedT opology i for only one direction, e.g., (p j , p k ). The extended graph, G ext , may contain fake edges that Byzantine nodes reports on their existence. Nevertheless, G ext includes all the correct paths of the communication graph, G. Therefore, the 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths that exists in G also exists in G ext . These 2f + 1 paths facilitate our polynomial cost solution.
The sender uses the chosen paths to repeatedly forward the message m that should arrive to the receiver. The sender uses a label to identify the messages. Roughly speaking, the receiver deliver a message received at least c · n + 1 consecutive times from f + 1 vertex independent paths (according to the path carried in the message). Once the receiver delivers a message to the network layer, the receiver starts to repeatedly send acknowledgments with the label of the delivered message over 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths. In addition, the receiver also restarts its counters and the log of received messages upon a message delivery to the network layer. Similarly the sender count acknowledgments to the current label used, when the sender receives at least c · n + 1 acknowledgments on a set of f + 1 vertex disjoint paths, the sender fetches the next message from the network layer, changes the label and starts to send the new message. We note that starting from an arbitrary configuration, the sender eventually fetches a message from the network layer. This is obvious since if the sender is sending the same message forever, then the receiver counters on f + 1 paths must exceed c · n + 1. From this point the receiver sends acknowledgments with the correct label forever ensuring that the sender fetches the next message.
The pseudocode of the algorithm appears in Algorithm 2. In every iteration of the infinite loop, p i fetches a message (line 3). Following the fetch, p i prepares the label for the next message (line 4). Once the label is ready, p i starts sending the message over 2f + 1 vertex disjoint messages which p i calculates in the procedure ByzantineF aultT oleranceSend(M essage). When p i gets enough acknowledgments regarding the current message (see line 5), p i stops sending the current message and fetches another message.
Upon receiving a message m, node p i checks in line 7 whether p i is the destination of the message. If not, p i forwards the message to the next node on the intended path of the message, not forgetting to update the visited path. If however p i is the destination of the message, p i checks the type of the message in line 10. If the type of the message is Data then (in line 11) p i inserts the message payload and label to the part of the data structure associated with the message source, i.e., the sender, and the message visited path. In line 27, node p i checks whether 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths relayed the message at least capacity · n + 1 times, where capacity is an upper bound on the number of messages in transit over a communication link. If so, p i delivers the message to the above layer (line 20), clears the entire data structure and finally sends acknowledgments on 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths until a new message is confirmed. Moreover, in line 21 we signal that we are ready to receive a new message. If the type of the message is ACK, we act almost as when the message is of type Data. When the condition in line 18 holds, we signal that the message was confirmed at the receiver by setting Approved to be true, in line 18.
Correctness proof. Let us consider three labels, 0, 1, and 2 that are used by the sender in a round robin fashion. Whenever at least c · n + 1 identical messages arrive at the receiver with the same label on each of f + 1 vertex independent paths, the receiver delivers them, nullify the counters, empty queues and send acknowledges with the label of the delivered message over 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths (cf. line 13). The sender clears counters and queues whenever the sender changes label.
First we prove that the sender fetches infinitely often, by assuming it is not and proving that eventually the receiver sends acknowledgments with the label used by the sender. Hence, the sender must fetch (see Lemma 13) . Then in between the second and the fourth fetch of any four successive fetches, where without the loss of generality, the first fetch is with label 0, the second with 1, the third with label 2 and the fourth with 0 the receiver clears its counter and the last fetched message in this sequence that is with label 0 is later delivered.
Following the fetch of each of the first three messages and before the next one, the sender must count c · n + 1 acknowledgments with the current label that the sender uses to send, namely with 0, 1 and 2. Since the sender reset the counters when changing the sending label to 1, the receiver must send at least one acknowledgment with label 1 and then with label 2, following the corresponding fetches. Thus, the receiver must clear its counters at least once following the second fetch and before the fourth fetch and then start sending acknowledgments with label 2. After clearing the counters by the receiver and starting sending acknowledgments with label 2 a message with label 0 that is next to be sent, must be delivered and no other message can be counted as arriving at least c · n + 1 times through f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths. Detailed proof appears in the Appendix and in [7] .
Note that the code of Algorithm 2 considers only one possible pair of source and destination. A manysource to many-destination version of this algorithm can simply use a separate instantiation of this algorithm for each pair of source and destination.
Extensions and Conclusions
As extension, we suggest to combine the algorithms for r-neighborhood network discovery and the end-toend capabilities in order to allow the use of end-to-end message delivery within the r-neighborhoods. These two algorithms can be used by the nodes, under reasonable node density assumptions, for discovering their r-neighborhoods and then extending the scope of their end-to-end capabilities beyond their r-neighborhood, as we sketch next. We instruct further remote nodes to relay topology information, and in this way collect information on remote neighborhoods. One can consider an algorithm for studying specific remote neighborhood that are defined, for example, by their geographic region, assuming the usage of GPS inputs; a specific direction and distance from the topology exploring node defines the exploration goal. The algorithm nominates 2f + 1 nodes in the specific direction to return further information towards the desired direction. The sender uses end-to-end communication to the current 2f + 1 nodes in the front of the current exploration, asking them for their r-neighborhood, chooses a new set of 2f + 1 nodes for forming a new front. It then instructs each of the current nodes in the current front to communicate with each node in the chosen new front, to nominate the new front nodes to form the exploration front.
To ensure stabilization, this interactive process of remote information collection should never stop. Whenever the current collection process investigates beyond the closest r-neighborhood, we concurrently start a new collection process in a pipeline fashion. The output is the result of the last finalized collection process. Thus, having a correct output after the first time a complete topology investigation is finalized.
In this work we presented two deterministic, self-stabilizing Byzantine-resilience algorithms for topology discovery and end-to-end message delivery. We have also considered an algorithm for discovering r-neighborhood in polynomial time, communication and space. Lastly, we mentioned a possible extension for exploring and communicating with remote r-neighborhoods using polynomial resources as well.
The obtained end-to-end capabilities can be used for communicating the public keys of parties and establish private keys, in spite of f corrupted nodes that may try to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, an attack that the classical Public key infrastructure (PKI) does not cope with. Once private keys are established encrypted messages can be forwarded over any specific f + 1 node independent paths, one of which must be Byzantine free. The Byzantine free path will forward the encrypted message to the receiver while all corrupted messages will be discarded. Since our system should be self-stabilizing, the common private secret should be re-established periodically.
Algorithm 2: Self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient end-to-end delivery, code for node p i .
Interface: F etchM essage(): Get a new message from the upper layer. We denote by InputM essageQueue the unbounded queue of all messages that are to be delivered to the destination; Interface: DeliverM essage(Source, M essage): Deliver an arriving message to the higher layer. We denote by
OutputM essageQueue the unbounded queue of all messages that are to be delivered to the higher layer. We assume that it always contains at least the last message inserted to it; Input: Conf irmedT opology: The discovered topology, which is represent by a set of directed edges included in P × P , see Algorithm 1; Data Structure: Transport layer messages: Source, Destination, V isitedP ath, IntentedP ath, ARQLabel, T ype, P ayload , where Source is the sending node, Destination is the target node, V isitedP ath is the actual relay path, IntentedP ath is the planned relay path, ARQLabel is the sequence number of the stop-and-wait ARQ protocol, and T ype ∈ {Data, ACK} message type, where DATA and ACK are constant; Field: P ayload: the message data; Variable M essage: the current message being sent; Variable ReceivedM essages[j][P ath] : queue of p j 's messages that were relayed over path P ath (see Figure 1) ; Variable Conf irmations[j][P ath] : queue of p j 's message acknowledgments that were relayed over path P ath (see Figure 1) ; Variable label: the current sequence number of the stop-and-wait ARQ protocol; Variable Approved: A Boolean variable indicating whether M essage was accepted at the destination; Function: N odeDisjointP aths(S): Test S, a set of paths, to encode at least f + 1 vertex disjoint paths; 
Proof.
The queue Inf ormedT opologyany i , is made up of messages in the form node, neighborhood, visitedpath . All nodes that appear in the message, i.e., in the first, second or third entry of the tuple are in N . The first entry, i.e. the node name is one of n possibilities. The second and third entries are subsets of N . Thus each of them has 2 n possibilities. In total there can be at most 2 n · 2 n · n messages in every Inf ormedT opologyany i . Definition 3 specifies the requirements of the network topology discovery task. Definition 4 considers correct paths and Definition 5 considers uncorrupted graph topology messages. Lemma 2 shows that eventually correct paths do not relay non valid messages. Namely, invalid messages can only exist as the result of: (1) Byzantine interventions that corrupt messages, or (2) transient faults, which occur only prior to the arbitrary starting configuration considered. 2 
Definition 3 (Legal output) Given correct node p i ∈ C, we say that p i 's output is legal, if it encodes graph
G output = (V out , E out ): (1) C ⊆ V out ⊆ C ∪ B ⊆ N , and (2) (E ∩ (C × C)) ⊆ E out ⊆ (E ∩ (C × C)) ∪ (B × (C ∪ B)) ⊆ N × N .
Lemma 2 (Eventually valid messages) Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1 that starts in an arbitrary configuration. Within O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, the system reaches a configuration after which only valid messages are relayed on correct paths.
Proof. Let c ∈ R be the starting configuration. Suppose that c includes an invalid message, m = ℓ, N eighborhood ℓ , V isitedP ath ℓ , in transit between correct nodes. The lemma is obviously correct for the case that m is relayed by Byzantine nodes during the first O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds of R. Therefore, we consider only the correct paths, path, over which m is relayed during the first O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds of R. We show that, within O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, no correct node in path relays m. Let p j , p i ∈ path be correct neighbors on the correct path. Suppose that in c, message m is in transit from p j to p i . Upon the arrival of message m to p i (line 7), p i sends m i = ℓ, N eighborhood ℓ , V isitedP ath ℓ ∪ {j} to any neighbor p k ∈ path on the path for which p k ∈ N i ∧ k ∈ V isitedP ath ℓ , see line 9. Node p i adds p j 's identifier to m's visited path V isitedP ath ℓ , see line 9. The same argument holds for any correct neighbors, p ′ j , p ′ j ∈ path when p j sends message m ′ j to the next node in path, node p ′ i .
Therefore, within |path \ V isitedP ath ℓ | asynchronous rounds, it holds that N ′ i ∩ (path \ V isitedP ath ℓ ) = {p ′ j , p ′ i }. Note that p ′ i makes sure that V isitedP ath ′ ℓ does not encode loops, i.e., p k ∈ V isitedP ath ′ ℓ , see line 9. Therefore, node p ′ i does not relay message m ′ to p k .
Definition 6 considers queues that their recent valid messages encode at least f + 1 vertex disjoint paths. Moreover, the invalid ones encode at most f such paths.
Definition 6 (Valid queue)
Let p i , p k ∈ C be two correct nodes.
We say that p i 's queue, Inf ormedT opology i , is valid (with respect to p k ) whenever there is a prefix, V alidInf ormation i,k , of messages m k in the queue Inf ormedT opology i , such that: (1) there is a subset, V alid = {m ℓ = k, N eighborhood k , V isitedP ath ℓ : m ℓ is valid} ⊆ V alidInf ormation i,k , for which the set {V isitedP ath ℓ } encodes at least f + 1 vertex disjoint paths, and (2) the set, Invalid = {m ℓ = k, N eighborhood k , V isitedP ath ℓ : m ℓ is invalid} ⊆ V alidInf ormation i,k , for which the set {V isitedP ath ℓ } encodes at most f vertex disjoint paths.
Claim 3 shows that, within O(|C|) asynchronous rounds, correct paths propagate valid messages. Proof. Let c ∈ R be the first configuration that follows the start of m i 's propagation in path. I.e., c is the configuration that immediately follows the step in which node p i sends m i by executing line 6. Let p r , p j ∈ path be two correct neighbors on the path. Without the loss of generality, suppose that node p i sends message m i directly to node p r , i.e., in c, node p r is just about to receive m i . The proof arguments hold also when assuming that p j sends message m j = i, N i , {r} to the next node in path. Thus, generality is not lost. We show that, within one asynchronous round, p r sends m r to p j . Upon the arrival of message m i to p r (line 7), node p r sends the message m r to any neighbor, such as p j , for which p j ∈ N r ∧ r ∈ V isitedP ath i = ∅, see line 9. Since the same argument holds when p j sends m j to the next node in path, we have that within |path| asynchronous rounds, m ′ i is delivered to node p k .
Claim 3 Let path ⊆ C be a correct path from
Lemma 4 shows that queues get to become valid. We show that condition (1) of Definition 6 holds. There are 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths between p i and p k . At most f nodes are Byzantine and thus, there are at least f + 1 vertex disjoint paths between p i and p k that are correct. By Claim 3 within O(|C|) asynchronous rounds, a valid message, m k , is received on all f + 1 (correct) vertex disjoint paths. Message m k is inserted to Inf ormedT opology i after configuration c. Therefore, m k is in front of m barrier . Hence, the set V alid = {m ℓ = ℓ, N eighborhood ℓ , V isitedP ath ℓ : m ℓ is valid} ⊆ V alidInf ormation i,k contains at least f +1 valid messages whose respective visited paths, V isitedP ath ℓ , are vertex disjoint.
Lemma 4 (Eventually valid queues) Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1 that starts in an arbitrary
We show that condition (2) of Definition 6 holds. Any invalid messages, m k , that is sent after configuration c, must go through a Byzantine node, see Lemma 2.
Claim 5 Suppose that message m is relayed through a Byzantine node after configuration c, then in any following configuration, while m is still in transit, there is a Byzantine node in the visited path.
Proof. Observe the first correct node p k after the last Byzantine node b on m's path. p k is correct, thus it inserts b to the visited path. b is the last on the path and so the visited path must contain it until end of transit or passing through a different Byzantine.
Each such Byzantine node is recorded in the message path, see Claim 5. Since there are at most f Byzantine nodes, there could be at most f such messages with vertex disjoint paths. This completes the proof condition (2) and the lemma.
Lemma 7 shows that correct information gets confirmed, and requires Definition 7.
Definition 7 (Message confirmation) We say that message
m i = k, N eighborhood k , V isitedP ath k i is confirmed (by node p i ) when N eighborhood k ⊆ Conf irmedT opology i .
Lemma 6 (Eventually confirmed messages) Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1 that starts in an arbitrary configuration and p i , p k ∈ C be any pair of correct nodes. Within O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, the system reaches a configuration after which the fact that message
Proof. Let c ∈ R be the first configuration in which Inf ormedT opology i is a valid queue and node p i completes a full iteration of the do forever loop that starts in line 1. By Lemma 4, the system reaches c within O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds.
We how that in configuration c, the array Result i satisfies that Result i [k] = indices(N ℓ ). We go through the computation of Result in lines 2 to 4.
• ComputeResults(), line 2.
be ComputeResults()'s return value with respect to node p k . We show that Res i [k] = indices(N ℓ ). Moreover, we show that the neighborhood that will be found will be that which is represented in V alid = {m ℓ = k, N eighborhood k , V isitedP ath ℓ : m ℓ is valid} ⊆ V alidInf ormation i,k .
We recall that the set {V isitedP ath ℓ } encodes at least f + 1 disjoint paths. Also in the prefix V alidInf ormation i,k one can not find f + 1 invalid messages with vertex disjoint messages; See Definition 6.
The function must choose the message containing the neighborhood N eighborhood k . Otherwise, we have chosen a different neighborhood for k, say N eighborhood
That is, at the time of checking line 19 with neighborhood N eighborhood ℓ = N eighborhood ′ k , there were at least f + 1 vertex disjoint paths in opinion[N eighborhood ℓ ]. This is in contradiction to condition (2) of Definition 6. Moreover in line 20, it holds Count[k] > f + 1, since at least all the correct paths were counted.
• RemoveContradictions(), ≤ f . We demonstrate that, for any correct path V isitedP ath k , there exists no p ℓ for which P athContradictsN eighborhood(p ℓ , Res i [ℓ], V isitedP ath k ) = true, which is the condition in line 24.
We explain that there is no node p ℓ and a contradicting edge (p j , p ℓ ) with the set Res i [ℓ] . By the assumption that V isitedP ath k is correct and that node p ℓ ∈ V isitedP ath k , we have that p ℓ ∈ C is correct. Thus Res i [ℓ] = indices(N ℓ ), see previous item of this claim on ComputeResults(). V isitedP ath k is correct, and therefore (p j , p ℓ ) must be in V isitedP ath k .
• RemoveGarbage(), line 4. This procedure does not modify Res i = RemoveContradictions(ComputeResults()). We have shown that Result i [k] = indices(N k ). Thus, only the correct neighborhood is confirmed for every correct node p k .
Lemma 7 shows that eventually there are no fake nodes.
Lemma 7 (Eventually no fake nodes) Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1 that starts in an arbitrary configuration, p j ∈ N be any node, and p ℓ ∈ P \(C ∪B) be a node that is not included in the communication graph, G. Within O(|C ∪B|) asynchronous rounds, the system reaches a configuration after which (p j , p ℓ ) ∈ Conf irmedT opology i Proof. Let c ∈ R be the configuration reached within O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds according to Lemma 6. For any correct node, p i ∈ C, we show that in c, the execution of RemoveContradictions()
We start by showing that for every path p that relays a message which encodes the set Result i [ℓ], and does not contain Byzantine nodes, a contradiction is found in RemoveContradictions(). Namely, the if conditions of line 24 holds.
Note that, p may not be a correct path even though it contains no Byzantine nodes. For example p may contain nodes p z that are not even in the communication graph, i.e., p z ∈ P \ (C ∪ B).
Let p r ∈ C ∪ B be the first correct node on path p. Such a node exists, because p i is correct and on the path p. Since p r is correct, after the execution of ComputeResults(), we have that p r 's neighborhood, N r , is encoded in Result i [r], see Lemma 6. Denote the last edge in the path (p r , p s ), where p s ∈ P \ (C ∪ B). Note that node p s is not a node in the system and since Result i [r] encodes N r 's neighborhood, we have that p s ∈ Result i [r]. Thus, the edge (p r , p s ) is contradicting with the set Result i [r] . Namely, by the condition in line 24, we have that line 25 must decrease Count [ℓ] .
We note that immediately before the function RemoveContradictions() returns, the integer Count[ℓ] may count only incorrect paths, which contain at least one Byzantine node. Since there are at most f Byzantine nodes, Count[ℓ] ≤ f as needed.
Theorem 8 demonstrates the self-stabilization properties.
Theorem 8 (Self-stabilization) Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1 that starts in an arbitrary configuration and p i ∈ C be a correct node. Within O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, the system reaches a safe configuration after which p i 's output is always legal, see Definition 3. Proof. The systems reaches configuration c ∈ R of Lemma 6 within O(|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds. We show that c is a safe configuration by showing that the output is legal, we must show that Conf irmedT opology i encodes a graph G output = (V out , E out ), such that:
For every correct node p k ∈ C, we have that N k is confirmed in c, see Lemma 6. Thus, p k ∈ V out and condition (1) holds.
Let (p j , p k ) be an edge in the communication graph between two correct nodes, we show (p j , p k ) ∈ E out . Since p j is correct, it is inserted to Conf irmedT opology i , see Lemma 6. Thus, (p j , p k ) ∈ edges(N j ) ∧ edges(N j ) ⊆ Conf irmedT opology i in c, thus condition (2) holds as well.
There is no p ℓ ∈ P \ (C ∪ B) and node p j ∈ N , such that (p ℓ p j ) ∈ Conf irmedT opology i , see Lemma 7. Thus, V out ⊆ C ∪ B ⊆ N and E out ⊆ (E ∩ (C × C)) ∪ (B × (C ∪ B)) ⊆ P × N . I.e., conditions (3) and (4) hold in c.
B Correctness of Algorithm 2
Lemma 9 shows that senders and receivers can eventually find at least 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths between them. Note that at least f + 1 of them are correct. 
Proof.
Let c be a safe configuration with respect to Algorithm 1. Let P aths = getDisjointP aths(Conf irmedT opology ∪ SuspiciousEdges(), i, Destination) be a set of disjoint paths in c, as in line 25, where i ∈ {s, r}. We first show that | P aths |≥ 2f + 1 before showing that at least f + 1 of them are correct.
We consider the graph G ′ = (N, E G ′ ), which is computed from Conf irmedT opology and the suspicious edges in c. We demonstrate that G ′ contains the real communication graph, G. Let e = (p j , p k ) ∈ E G ′ . When p j and p k are both correct, e ∈ G ′ since c is safe. When p j is correct and p k is Byzantine, we must consider the cases in which p k reports, and does not report, e as part of its local neighborhood. Namely, either e ∈ Conf irmedT opology, or e ∈ SuspiciousEdges(), because p k does not report about e, but p i does. Since G ⊆ G ′ , G ′ must contain 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths between any p s and p r , because G does. Thus | P aths |≥ 2f + 1.
Moreover, the same arguments implies that there may be at most f incorrect paths, which contain at least one Byzantine node. Hence, there are at least f + 1 correct nodes in P aths.
Definitions 8, 9 and 10 are needed for lemmas 11, 12 and 13.
Definition 8 (Confirmation)
Given configuration c, we say that message m is confirmed (by the receiver) when m ∈ OutputM essageQueue. Definition 9 (Approve) Given fair execution, R, of Algorithm 2, we say that message m = Source, Destination, V isitedP ath, IntentedP ath, ARQLabel, DAT A, P ayload is being approved (by the sender p Source ) during the first atomic step, a sender , in which the sender executes line 18, where Source = sender ARQLabel = msg sender .ARQLabel and P ayload = msg sender .P ayload, see line 17. Denote by c approved the configuration that immediately follows a sender . Given configuration c that appears after c approved in R, we say that message m is approved (by the sender) in configuration c. Proof. Denote c send as the configuration immediately following the first step in which p r sends acknowledgment Ack in R, see line 23. Within O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, the first frame containing Ack arrives at p s , see Claim 10. Moreover, after another O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, every correct path relays message Ack at least O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) times. This is correct since every asynchronous round, p r sends a new frame containing Ack on each of the 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths. Moreover, by Claim 10, the last frame sent on all 2f + 1 paths arrives after another O(capacity · |C ∪ B|).
The queues, Conf irmations[p r ][ * ] are cleared only when a message sent to p r is approved, see line 2. Since, p r is acknowledging the current message, M sg, by sending Ack, the only message that can be approved is M sg. This is true since each path, P ath, may contain at most capacity ·|C ∪B| acknowledgments for other messages in the path queues.
Assume, in the way of proof by contradiction, that M sg is not approved by p s . By the arguments above, p s 's queues, Conf irmations s [p r ][ * ], which contains p r 's acknowledgments that p s received, were not cleared at least since c send , see line 2. Thus, p s contains capacity · n + 1 indications of Ack on f + 1 vertex disjoint paths. Denote c last as the configuration immediately after the arrival of the (capacity · n + 1)-th frame of the f + 1'th path to relay capacity · n + 1 frames containing Ack. Immediately after c last , p s must go through line 18, because the conditions in line 18 hold. Thus, a contradiction and M sg is approved within O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds.
Lemma 13 shows that the senders repeatedly fetch messages. The proof considers the case in which the sender, p s , does not wait in line 5 for a long time before considering the case in which p s does wait. We show that for the latter case, the receiver, p r , confirms p s 's current message. After confirming the message, the receiver, p r , begins sending acknowledgments to the sender, p s . The proof shows that after the acknowledgments are sent, p s approves the message and fetches a new one. We show this by considering the case in which p r repeatedly sends acknowledgments for a sufficient amount of time, and a case in which it does not. Suppose that p s does not wait in line 5 more than O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds. In this case, p s starts the infinite loop again within O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, and fetch a new message, see line 3. Thus, for the case in which p s does not wait in line 5 more than O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, the lemma is correct.
Lemma 13
Suppose that p s is executing line 5 and waits for acknowledgments on message M sg for more than O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds. Thus, p s floods 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths with the message M sg, see Claim 9. Eventually, the receiver, p r , receives message M sg for O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) times on f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths and confirms M sg, see Claim 11. After confirming it, the receiver sends acknowledgments on 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths until confirming a new message M sg new . This is true because the condition in line 23 holds only when a new message is confirmed, see line 14.
Let us consider the case in which, during O(capacity ·|C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, message M sg new does not arrive to the receiver. By Claim 12, eventually the sender receives the acknowledgments for capacity · n + 1 times on f + 1 vertex disjoint paths. Claim 12 also says that the sender considers the message accepted by the receiver. In line 18, the sender assigns Approved = true. Thus, the condition in line 5 holds and the sender fetches the next message, see line 3. Hence, the system reaches configuration c f etch that immediately follows a step in which the sender, p s , fetches the next message. Thus, for the case in which, during O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, message M sg new does not arrive to the receiver, the lemma is correct.
We continue by considering the case in which, during O(capacity · |C ∪ B|) asynchronous rounds, message M sg new does arrive to the receiver. Let c conf be the configuration that immediately follows the step in which p r confirms M sg. Since the receiver confirms M sg, we have that p r is clear (with respect to the sender) in configuration c conf , see Definition 10 and line 22.
If M sg new was sent by the sender, it must have been fetched after c, and c f etch is reached when message M sg new is fetched. It may be the case however, that M sg new was not sent by the sender. Message M sg new was confirmed by 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths. Since there are at most f Byzantines, at least one of these paths, P ath, must be correct. Moreover, in c conf , the receiver is clear, thus the capacity · n + 1 that p r counts in ReceivedM essages[p s ][ * ] have all been received after configuration c conf . Note that the sender sends at least one of these messages, because at most capacity · n messages could be in the edges of P ath at any given configuration. Thus the sender sends M sg new , which p s fetches immediately before c f etch . I.e., the system reaches c f etch .
Theorem 8 says that, starting from that fourth (or even the third) message that the sender fetches, the receiver confirms the sender's messages. The proof of Theorem 8 is based on Lemma 14, which says that, in every sequence of four messages that the sender is fetching, the receiver confirms the fourth (or even the third) message. Proof. By definition, c 2 immediately follows atomic step a 2 , in which, after clearing the confirmation queue in line 2, the sender fetches message m 2 and sends it. Starting from c sender−clear , the sender receives capacity · n + 1 acknowledgments on 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths for the current message with label 1. Note that at least one of these 2f + 1 paths, P ath, is correct, because there are f Byzantine. Since |P ath| ≤ n and each edge on P ath may contain at most capacity messages, we have that at least one of the acknowledgments that includes P ath as its visiting path, is sent by the receiver between c sender−clear and configuration c receiver−send ∈ R. We show that c receiver−send = c receiver−clear .
Lemma 14
This means that after c sender−clear , the sender clears the confirmations queue, Conf irmations[receiver][ * ], and fetches the next message, assigning it the label 2, see lines 2 through line 5. By similar arguments, we know that the receiver sends at least one acknowledgment with label 2.
To conclude, there is a configuration c ∈ R in which the receiver is sending acknowledgments with label 1, and then a configuration c ′ in which the receiver sends acknowledgments with label 2. Moreover, between two consecutive executions of line 23, the receiver has to go through line 22. Thus, the receiver cleared it's message queues, Thus, m i is confirmed only after a period that follows c receiver−clear and includes its reception at least capacity · n + 1 times on each of the 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths.
Recall that we assume that there are at most f Byzantine nodes in the system. At least one path, P ath, of the above 2f + 1 paths is correct. Moreover, |P ath| ≤ n and each edge on P ath may contain at most capacity messages. Thus, at least one of the capacity · n + 1 message that were relayed on the correct path P ath was sent by the sender. This completes the correctness proof.
